

# EXHIBIT A

Kenneth A. Gallo (*pro hac vice*)  
Bruce H. Searby (*pro hac vice*)  
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP  
2001 K Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20006-1047  
Telephone: 202.223.7356  
Facsimile: 202.204.7356  
kgallo@paulweiss.com  
bsearby@paulweiss.com

Colin C. West (SBN 184095)  
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP  
Three Embarcadero Center  
San Francisco, CA 94111-4067  
Telephone: 415.393.2000  
Facsimile: 415.393.2286  
colin.west@bingham.com

*Attorneys for Applicant*  
Sharp Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

IN RE CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT)  
ANTITRUST LITIGATION

Master File No.: 3:07-cv-5944-SC  
MDL No. 1917

This Document Relates to:

IN RE: APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL  
ASSISTANCE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF  
SUBPOENA PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1782  
TO OBTAIN DISCOVERY FOR USE IN A  
FOREIGN PROCEEDING

Case No. CV-12-80151 MISC (SC)

**SHARP CORPORATION'S REPLY  
TO THE RESPONSE OF  
DEFENDANTS AND THE  
OPPOSITION OF SAVERI &  
SAVERI, INC. TO SHARP'S  
OBJECTIONS TO THE SPECIAL  
MASTER'S REPORT AND  
RECOMMENDATION REGARDING  
SUBPOENA**

**ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED**

Date: December 21, 2012  
Time: 10:00 am  
Judge: Honorable Samuel Conti  
Courtroom: One, 17th Floor

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION .....	1
II.	ARGUMENT .....	2
A.	The Court Should Review the Report’s Conclusions <i>De Novo</i> .....	2
B.	Sharp’s Subpoena Seeks Documents Unavailable from Parties Before the Korean Court .....	2
C.	Defendants’ Response Does Not Show That Receptivity and Comity Concerns Weigh Against Section 1782 Relief.....	3
D.	Defendants’ Responses Regarding Burden Are Unsupported .....	5
E.	Defendants’ and Saveri’s Arguments Concerning Confidentiality Ignore Sharp’s Representations to the Court .....	6
III.	CONCLUSION .....	8

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

**Page(s)**

**CASES**

<i>In re Application of Microsoft Corp.</i> , No. C 06-80038 JF (PVT), 2006 WL 825250 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2006) .....	4
<i>In re Baycol Products Litigation</i> , MDL No. 1431, 2003 WL 22331293 (D. Minn. May 6, 2003) .....	5
<i>Four Pillars Enterprises Co., Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp.</i> , 308 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002).....	7
<i>Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.</i> , 542 U.S. 241 (2004).....	1, 2, 3, 4
<i>In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation</i> , 333 F. Supp. 2d 333 (E.D. Pa. 2004) .....	6

**STATUTES**

28 U.S.C. §1782(a) .....	passim
--------------------------	--------

1 Sharp Corporation respectfully submits the following memorandum in reply to  
2 Defendants' Response to Sharp Corporation's Objections to the Special Master's Report and  
3 Recommendation Regarding Subpoena, filed on November 13, 2012 (MDL Dkt. No. 1442)  
4 ("Defs. Response"), and the Opposition of Saveri & Saveri, Inc. to Objections of Sharp  
5 Corporation to the Special Master's Report and Recommendation Regarding Subpoena, also filed  
6 on November 13, 2012 (MDL Dkt. No. 1447) ("Saveri Opp.").

## 8 I. INTRODUCTION

9 Defendants and Saveri leave undisturbed the following points Sharp made in its  
10 Objections: (1) Sharp sought the most efficient way possible to obtain the production of relevant  
11 documents from the files of numerous parties that it needs to pursue its claims in Korea; (2) Sharp  
12 eliminated virtually any burden to Saveri from producing the requested documents by offering to  
13 pay the costs; and (3) the Special Master recommended rejecting Sharp's application outright  
14 instead of seeking to trim or narrow it. Defendants seek to evade the *de novo* review that the  
15 Special Master's key conclusions should undergo by portraying the report and recommendation  
16 as merely the logical result of a series of factual findings. Their arguments do not withstand  
17 scrutiny and, in any event, the report and recommendation fails under any standard, because its  
18 determinations on the *Intel* factors are a mix of erroneous conclusions of law, clearly erroneous  
19 factual findings, and immaterial considerations. And Saveri's half-page opposition consists of  
20 nothing more than the conclusory assertion that the Special Master's Report and  
21 Recommendation ("R&R") correctly resolved the issues.

22 This reply focuses on points raised in Defendants' response that misconstrue the law, the  
23 Special Master's recommendation, and the factual record that was before him. As indicated in  
24 our Objections, this Court should exercise its discretion to permit discovery of documents to  
25  
26  
27  
28

sustain Sharp's claim in Korea for antitrust damages from non-U.S. commerce, consistent with the purposes of Section 1782.

## II. ARGUMENT

### A. The Court Should Review the Report's Conclusions *De Novo*

Sharp demonstrated in its Objections that key determinations by the Special Master, such as that Sharp's subpoena was an impermissible attempt to circumvent restrictions on discovery in Korea, depend on legal conclusions that must be reviewed *de novo*. R&R at 4. Under any standard of review set forth in the order that the parties to the CRT litigation stipulated to appointing the Special Master, however, the report and recommendation should fail.<sup>1</sup> What defendants characterize as "findings" are, in many instances, legally immaterial under the analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in *Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.*, 542 U.S. 241 (2004); this includes speculation about the Korean defendants' future ability to enjoy fair access to discovery, and the "burden" on the participants in the Korean litigation of the requested documents being made available to Sharp and the Korean defendants for use in that case. Defs. Response at 1-2. The remaining findings are insufficient as a matter of law to support the conclusion that the *Intel* factors weigh against Sharp.

### B. Sharp's Subpoena Seeks Documents Unavailable from Parties Before the Korean Court

The Special Master concluded that the first *Intel* factor – whether the target of the discovery was present in the foreign litigation – weighed against Sharp. R&R at 3. But it remains uncontested that Saveri is not present in the foreign litigation, that Saveri has averred custody of all the documents Sharp seeks, and that Saveri has them all on a single computer

---

<sup>1</sup> *De novo* review of a special master's factual findings is the default standard under the federal rules absent a party's stipulation, with the district court's approval, to clear error review. *See* Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(f)(3).

1 server. It also remains uncontested that many of the parties that have produced documents in the  
 2 MDL Litigation are *not* before the Korean court and thus are not subject to its jurisdiction. *See*  
 3 Opposition to Motion to Quash at 4 (MDL Dkt. No. 1338); Transcript (“Tr.”) at 28 (MDL Dkt.  
 4 No. 1426-1).

5 Defendants defend the Special Master’s conclusion on the first *Intel* factor by focusing on  
 6 the fact – never disputed – that Sharp seeks information produced from the files of *certain*  
 7 *Defendants who are before the Korean court*. Defs. Response at 6. Defendants do not dispute,  
 8 however, that many of them are *not* before the Korean court nor subject to its discovery orders.  
 9 Therefore the documents from this latter group concerning the planning and execution of the  
 10 conspiracy cannot be obtained through discovery requests in the Korean court. Thus, the first  
 11 *Intel* factor must weigh in favor of Sharp – even under the theory that Saveri is not the real party  
 12 to look to in this analysis.

13  
 14  
 15 **C. Defendants’ Response Does Not Show That Receptivity and**  
 16 **Comity Concerns Weigh Against Section 1782 Relief**

17 Defendants make, in their response, a number of unpersuasive arguments to shore up the  
 18 unsupported determinations of the Special Master on the two *Intel* factors relating to the  
 19 receptivity of the Korean court to evidence produced in this process, and whether Sharp’s  
 20 subpoena is an effort to “circumvent” a foreign court’s procedures.<sup>2</sup> Defs. Response at 7-11.

21 The Special Master did *not* conclude, as Defendants claim in their Response, that the  
 22 Korean court would *not* be receptive to evidence produced in the MDL Litigation.<sup>3</sup> The Special  
 23

---

24 <sup>2</sup> Saveri also asserts, without support, that Sharp’s subpoena was an attempt to circumvent  
 25 limitations on discovery in Korea. Saveri Opp. at 1. Sharp’s arguments against Defendants apply  
 equally to Saveri.

26 <sup>3</sup> The Special Master also stated his “opinion” that limited discovery procedures such as those in  
 27 Korea “should be one of the reliable indicators” of the lack of receptivity of the foreign court, but  
 28 this plainly did not constitute a finding by the Special Master of a lack of receptivity by the  
 Korean court in this case. R&R at 4.

1 Master concluded that there was no statement by the Korean court showing that it would be  
2 receptive to the fruits of U.S. judicial assistance. *See* R&R at 4 (“The Korean court has not made  
3 any statement or other indication on the merits as to whether it would or would not welcome such  
4 discovery.”). The Special Master improperly assigned the burden of proof to Sharp, instead of to  
5 those opposing the discovery. As demonstrated in Sharp’s Objection, the courts that have  
6 actually addressed the question of which party bears the burden of proof on the foreign receptivity  
7 factor have made clear that the burden is on the party *opposing* the Section 1782 discovery to  
8 demonstrate a lack of receptivity in the foreign court. *See* Objections at 10-12. None of  
9 Defendants’ arguments to the contrary refute this point.<sup>4</sup>

11 Defendants also incorrectly suggest that *Intel*’s general references to comity and parity  
12 concerns permit a court to apply a *de facto* foreign-discoverability rule under the guise of  
13 applying the discretionary factors regarding “receptivity” or “circumvention.” Defs. Response at  
14 8. As demonstrated in our opening brief, the “circumvention” factor under *Intel* is meant to  
15 redress circumstances different than those present here. *See* Objections at 13-15. And the  
16 “receptivity” factor requires an opponent of the discovery to show more than what Defendants  
17 have shown here. Defendants have identified no post-*Intel* case where a court denied discovery  
18 solely on the grounds that the discovery procedures in the foreign jurisdiction did not permit the  
19 discovery because of a need to identify the requested documents with more specificity.

21 Finally, Defendants wrongly argue that Sharp could have obtained discovery in Korea if it  
22 had used a KFTC report as a guide to identifying specific documents to request. But Defendants  
23 do not explain that the report they recommend had to do with color display tubes (“CDTs”), and  
24

---

25  
26 <sup>4</sup> Defendants’ citation to *In re Application of Microsoft Corp.*, No. C 06-80038 JF (PVT), 2006  
27 WL 825250, at \*2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. March 29, 2006), is irrelevant. Defs. Response at 9. The  
28 quotation they rely on is out of context; the court there was merely stating that the party seeking  
the application bore the burden of demonstrating it was warranted generally.



not the color picture tubes (“CPTs”) that are the subject of Sharp’s Korean litigation. *Compare* Declaration of Hae Eun Choi ¶ 3, (MISC Dkt. No. 18-1), and Declaration of Keum-Seok Oh dated September 5, 2012, ¶ 4 (“Oh Decl.”) (MDL Dkt. No. 1339) *with* Korean Complaint at 12-13, (MISC Dkt. No. 2); *see also* Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 31 (MDL Dkt. No. 436) (noting that after June of 2000, meetings concerning CDT and CPT products were held separately and at different venues). Defendants have thus failed to contradict Sharp’s assertion that it has not been in a position to conduct discovery in Korea and needs U.S. judicial assistance.

#### **D. Defendants’ Responses Regarding Burden Are Unsupported**

The Defendants’ responses and Saveri’s conclusory assertion regarding the supposed burden of complying with Sharp’s requested discovery are also unpersuasive. Neither Defendants nor Saveri respond to Sharp’s showing that: (1) Sharp nearly eliminated any burden to Saveri from producing the documents by offering to pay the costs of transferring the documents from the single computer server where they all reside; (2) the Special Master rejected Sharp’s application outright instead of seeking to trim or narrow it; and (3) Sharp sought to obtain the production of relevant documents needed to pursue its claims in Korea in the most efficient way possible. Sharp subpoenaed a custodian of a collection of documents already produced from various parties in the U.S. litigation about the *same* global conspiracy at issue in Korea – rather than issuing requests to various parties and/or requiring their document production efforts to start from scratch. *See* Objections at 17.

Special Master Legge explained his determination that Sharp’s subpoena would impose an undue burden by stating he was “unaware of any case that supports the use of § 1782 for the wholesale taking of all of the discovery in a large antitrust case.” R&R at 5. As Sharp demonstrated in its Objections, this is a legal error because there are, in fact, examples of courts

1 granting “wholesale” access to discovery records for use in a foreign proceeding, *including* in  
 2 large antitrust cases. Objections at 15-17. Defendants’ attempt to distinguish the cases is  
 3 unpersuasive. For example, Defendants contend that the Section 1782 Application was denied in  
 4 *In re Baycol Products Litig.*, MDL No. 1431, 2003 WL 22331293 (D. Minn. May 6, 2003). But  
 5 they omit that *the court allowed the Canadian plaintiffs to get access to all documents already*  
 6 *produced*. The Canadian plaintiffs there sought to “intervene for the limited purpose of  
 7 participating in and obtaining discovery that has been produced in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
 8 § 1782(a).” *Id.* at \*1. The court concluded,

10 to the extent that the application of the Canadian Plaintiffs seek to *conduct*  
 11 *discovery in the U.S.* pursuant to § 1782, the application must be denied. The  
 12 Court will thus grant the Canadian Plaintiffs’ motion to intervene only to the  
 extent that they seek access to documents already produced.

13 *Id.* at \*6 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court granted access to the documents already  
 14 produced in the MDL, as Sharp seeks here. Defendants’ other attempts to distinguish the cases  
 15 cited in the Objection also fail upon inspection. *See, e.g., In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig.*, 333 F.  
 16 Supp. 2d 333, 335, 342 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (granting access to “all discovery in this action including,  
 17 but not limited to, defendants’ documents, interrogatory responses and responses to requests for  
 18 admission, and deposition transcripts” pursuant to a motion to intervene, and noting that granting  
 19 the access “promotes” “the goals” of Section 1782).<sup>5</sup>

21 **E. Defendants’ and Saveri’s Arguments Concerning**  
 22 **Confidentiality Ignore Sharp’s Representations to the Court**

23 In granting Sharp’s initial application under Section 1782, this Court ordered that any use  
 24 of documents from the MDL Litigation by Sharp and other parties in the Korean Litigation would

---

26 <sup>5</sup> Saveri’s unsupported claim that Sharp’s subpoena “threatened to establish a precedent whereby  
 27 Saveri would become the source for documents for plaintiffs in similar litigations worldwide” is  
 28 unavailing. Saveri Opp. at 1. As shown in the cases discussed *supra* and in Sharp’s Objections,  
 U.S. courts have routinely granted foreign antitrust plaintiffs access to U.S. discovery; the  
 “precedent” is thus established.

1 be conditioned upon acceptance of the terms of the Stipulated Protective Order or entry of a  
2 Korean order that would extend substantially similar protection. *See* MDL Dkt. No. 1299 at 2.  
3 Sharp and its outside counsel have agreed to sign onto the Protective Order and executed, as  
4 necessary, copies of the Agreement and Acknowledgement to Be Bound, as modified to reflect  
5 use of the documents in the Korean Litigation, and Sharp has committed to protecting the small  
6 subset of documents actually selected for submission to the Korean court. *See* Objections at 19-  
7 20. These dual protections ensure that granting Sharp access to the documents would not  
8 “improperly frustrate” the protective order. *See* Defs. Response at 15.

9  
10 Defendants’ reliance on *Four Pillars Enterprises Co., Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp.*, 308  
11 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) to support their confidentiality concerns is misplaced. The “unusual”  
12 procedural scenario in that case apparently did not include *any* protections to preserve in the  
13 foreign litigation the confidential treatment of documents already produced in U.S. litigation. *See*  
14 *id.* at 1078-79. That stands in stark contrast to the situation here, where protections have been  
15 planned from the beginning of this case and can continued to be addressed until this Court is fully  
16 satisfied.  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1     **III.     CONCLUSION**

2             For the foregoing reasons, Sharp respectfully requests that the Court vacate the Special  
3     Master's Report and Recommendation, deny Defendants' motion to quash, and compel Saveri to  
4     produce the documents requested by the subpoena that was appropriately issued pursuant to  
5     Section 1782.

6     Dated: November 20, 2012

7                             By: /s/ Kenneth A. Gallo

8                             PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON  
9                             & GARRISON LLP  
10                            Kenneth A. Gallo (*pro hac vice*)  
11                            Bruce H. Searby (*pro hac vice*)  
12                            2001 K Street, NW  
13                            Washington, DC 20006  
14                            Telephone: 202.223.7356  
15                            Facsimile: 202.204.7356  
16                            kgallo@paulweiss.com  
17                            bsearby@paulweiss.com

18                            BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP  
19                            Colin C. West (CA State Bar No. 184095)  
20                            Three Embarcadero Center  
21                            San Francisco, CA 94111-4067  
22                            Telephone: 415.393.2000  
23                            Facsimile: 415.393.2286  
24                            colin.west@bingham.com

25                            *Attorneys for Applicant*  
26                            *Sharp Corporation*

27     Attestation: The filer of this document attests that the concurrence of the signatories thereto  
28     have been obtained.